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ABSTRACT. Oswald’s thesis posits that homeowners should have longer unemployment spells than
renters due to restricted mobility, but repeatedly the reverse is found. I contribute to solve this puzzle
analyzing both job search intensity and unemployment duration. First, I show that homeowner’s
mobility constraints have a negative impact on search. Theoretically, it is shown in a search model with
moving costs. Using U.K. Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, it is confirmed when considering outright
owners, while leveraged owners have the highest search. Second, I find evidence that homeowners
select search methods associated with shorter unemployment spells, suggesting that they search more
efficiently.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the last decades the orientation of several governments, particularly in Europe,
has been to promote homeownership (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Rohe, Van Zandt,
and McCarthy, 2002; Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Engelhardt et al., 2010). Conversely since
the 1980s economists have raised concerns about the consequences of large homeowner-
ship rates on the functioning of the labor market (Hughes and McCormick, 1987; Bover,
Muellbauer, and Murphy, 1989; Partridge and Rickman, 1997; Nickell, 1998; Nickell and
Layard, 1999; Pehkonen, 1999). The analysis of the relation between the housing tenure
and the labor market has received great attention after the contribution of Andrew Os-
wald, who in the 1990s pinned on high homeownership rates the blame for the high
unemployment rates in Europe (Oswald, 1996, 1997, 1999). The receipt he proposed to re-
duce unemployment was strikingly at odds with the prevailing political wisdom: “We can
put Europe back to work ...by reducing homeownership” (Oswald, 1999, p. 2). Although the
contribution of Oswald was not the first to investigate the relationship between homeown-
ership and unemployment, it has become popular to refer to it as “Oswald’s hypothesis.”
Thereafter, several studies using regional or cross-country data have provided some sup-
port to Oswald’s hypothesis (Belot and Van Ours, 2001; Green and Hendershott, 2001;
Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005; Munch, Rosholm, and Svarer, 2006; Coulson and Fisher,
2009; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2013).
The most influential microeconomic interpretation of the aggregate evidence has
focused on the supposedly lower job finding rates of unemployed people who own their
own home. In fact, since homeownership hampers the propensity to move for job reasons,
homeowners should experience longer unemployment spells than otherwise comparable
renters. While there is abundant evidence supporting the first element of this rationale
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(Henley, 1998; Munch, Rosholm, and Svarer, 2006; Battu, Ma, and Phimister, 2008; Van
Vuuren, 2009), several empirical studies have found no support for the second, and in
most cases even the opposite (Goss and Phillips, 1997; Coulson and Fisher, 2002; Flatau
et al., 2003; Munch et al., 2006; Battu et al., 2008; Van Vuuren, 2009).1
Recently, Blanchflower and Oswald (2013) and Laamanen (2013) have reinforced
the case against high homeownership rates assessing the role of possible negative ex-
ternalities (Bover et al., 1989). Their argument is not that homeowners themselves are
disproportionately unemployed (actually they find further evidence against that), rather
that the positive relation between homeownership and unemployment rates can be ex-
plained by negative externalities that the housing market can produce upon the labor
market.
The literature has investigated some possible explanations for the repeated failure
of Oswald’s hypothesis in micro data. One explanation looks at the dichotomy between
the local and nonlocal labor markets in studying the effect of moving costs. Munch et al.
(2006) point out that the lower mobility of owner-occupiers does not necessarily imply
lower exit rates from unemployment. In fact, homeowners should have higher reservation
wages for jobs that require a residential move, but also lower reservation wages for jobs
that do not. Therefore, whether or not homeowners find jobs overall less quickly should
be an empirical matter.
Another explanation has focused on the distinctions between outright owners and
mortgage-holders, and between private and social renters. The straight comparison be-
tween owners and nonowners could be misleading as mortgagers share some similarities
with private renters, and outright owners share some with social renters. First, commit-
ted housing expenditures such as the rent and, especially, the mortgage, should boost
exit rates off unemployment through higher pressure to return to work (Rouwendal and
Nijkamp, 2010; Arulampalam et al., 2000). However, for mortgagers this claim can be
challenged by the well-known “lock-in” effect, hypothesizing that mortgagers are more
reluctant to sell their homes, and hence less mobile, when their home’s price declines,
particularly as equity becomes negative (Zabel, 2012; Coulson and Grieco, 2013; Modes-
tino and Dennett, 2013).2 Although some empirical studies provide evidence for the lock-in
effect (Henley, 1998; Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy, 2010; Modestino and Dennett, 2013),
some others do not find any support (Donovan and Schnure, 2011; Schulhofer-Wohl, 2012;
Coulson and Grieco, 2013), suggesting that negative equity could even increase mobility
by bearing incentives to default (Coulson and Grieco, 2013). As consistent with the ar-
gument on committed expenditures, and with the latter evidence, mortgage-holders have
typically the best labor outcomes (Goss and Phillips, 1997; Flatau et al., 2003; Brunet,
Clark, and Lesueur, 2007; Kantor, Nijkamp, and Rouwendal, 2013). Second, social renters
face lock-in effects similarly to homeowners, due to below-market rent, long waiting lists,
security of tenure, and restricted transferability within social housing (Hughes and Mc-
Cormick, 1981, 1987, 2000; McCormick, 1983; Flatau et al., 2003; Battu et al., 2008).
For the mobility mechanism to emerge, the relevant comparison should be made
between outright owners and private renters. Indeed, restrictions to mobility of outright
owners are not contrasted by mortgage commitments, and private renters do not have
same mobility constraints as social renters. However, pieces of evidence on the comparison
1See Havet and Penot (2010) for a comprehensive survey of the literature analyzing the impact of
housing tenure on labor market outcomes, both at micro and macro level.
2The lock-in effect has been also related to nominal loss aversion (Genesove and Mayer, 2001; En-
gelhardt, 2003; Cunningham and Engelhardt, 2008) and to below-market interest rates on the current
mortgage (Quigley, 1987). However, Chan (2001) notes that the lock-in effect can be present only in case
of localized price declines.
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between outright owners and private renters are in general ambiguous (Flatau et al., 2003;
Brunet et al., 2007; Battu et al., 2008), providing again scant support to Oswald’s thesis.
Moreover the use of a multinomial specification makes it more complicated to control for
the likely endogeneity of housing tenure. Although the relevance of the endogeneity issue
(Green and Hendershott, 2002; Flatau et al., 2003; Van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004;
Munch et al., 2006; Brunet et al., 2007; Battu et al., 2008; Brunet and Lesueur, 2009;
Van Vuuren, 2009; Coulson and Fisher, 2009) and of a more refined definition of housing
tenure is often stressed in the literature, only seldom are these issues tackled jointly.
Despite this large body of research, the mechanisms leading less mobile homeowners
to exit unemployment more rapidly are not fully understood yet. In this paper, taking
into account existing explanations, I investigate a novel approach to solve this puzzle.
The solution I propose has two key ingredients. The first consists in showing that, besides
unemployment duration, homeowner’s mobility constraints have a negative impact on job
search intensity. This contribution moves from the consideration that job search intensity
can be more appropriate than unemployment duration to capture the impact of housing
tenure through the channel of interest.3 In fact, while higher mobility costs translate in
given differences in reservation wages and in search intensity levels between owners and
nonowners, unemployment durations could diverge for other reasons. The second contri-
bution of this paper consists in exploring one possible reason for diverging unemployment
outcomes. Specifically, I enquire whether homeowners are more efficient in the search
process.
The demonstration of the first proposition is conducted by performing a theoretical
and empirical analysis. First, I develop a model of endogenous job search effort with two
labor markets, which differ geographically as in Munch et al. (2006). In the baseline model
with exogenous search effort, the assumption of higher mobility costs yields the result
that homeowners have lower job finding rates far from home but higher job finding rates
locally. However, the impact on the job finding rate as a whole remains undetermined. By
treating search effort as endogenous, I show that lower mobility costs imply renters to
have unambiguously higher overall search intensity and job finding rate.
Second, making use of a data set drawn from the U.K. Labour Force Survey (LFS),
I test the main theoretical proposition by estimating the effect of housing tenure in a
search intensity equation. In line with a wealth of empirical studies, the job search effort
is proxied with the number of search methods used (Holzer, 1988; Blau and Robins, 1990;
Wadsworth, 1991; Schmitt and Wadsworth, 1993; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; Böheim
and Taylor, 2001; Addison and Portugal, 2000; Weber Mahringer, 2008; Manning, 2009;
Bachmann and Baumgarten, 2013). No one, however, has yet explored Oswald’s hypoth-
esis by this means. Also, the present study departs from most of those which attempt to
control for endogeneity of housing tenure by adopting a multinomial specification. Identi-
fication of the effect of multinomial treatments is achieved by using a set of instrumental
variables in a housing tenure selection model that are excluded from the main search
equation (Deb and Trivedi, 2006a, 2006b). The results show that outright owners search
less than private renters by around 11 percent, which is precisely what one would ex-
pect according to the mobility argument. Moreover, I find that mortgage-holders have
the highest search intensity, and that social renters search significantly less than private
renters.
The finding that outright owners search less intensively than (private) renters, taken
together with the repeated result that homeowners have shorter unemployment spells,
3Oswald’s hypothesis has also been explored, though to a less extent, by looking at the effect of
homeownership on the probability of being unemployed, on the risk of becoming unemployed, and on
wages (Havet and Penot, 2010). Homeowners perform typically better even in these cases.
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leads to the second contribution of this paper. Namely, I explore whether shorter unem-
ployment duration of homeowners, and specifically of outright owners, can be explained
by higher efficiency in the search process. The investigation of this insight is conducted
empirically by estimating two models. On the one side, a multinomial logit (MNL) model
is estimated to identify the effect of housing tenure on the selection of the main search
method. On the other side, a competing-risks model with employment and inactivity as
competing-risks is estimated to identify search methods with shorter hazards to job.
I distinguish six main methods of job search: public employment centers (PEC),
private employment agency (PRIAGENCY), newspaper advertisements (NEWS), direct
approach to employer (DAE), social network (SOCNET), and other. PEC is typically ob-
served to be ineffective for unemployed and its use has often been criticized (Holzer, 1988;
Blau and Robins, 1990; Addison and Portugal, 2000; Longhi and Taylor, 2011). I find that
(private) renters are significantly more likely to rely on PEC as the main search channel
relative to (outright) owners, while (outright) owners are relatively more likely to use
NEWS. Estimates of the competing-risks model suggest that PEC relatively lengthens
the time needed to reenter employment. Also, counter-Oswald evidence emerges again
in these estimates since outright owners and especially mortgagers are found to become
employed more quickly than (private) renters. Taken jointly, these findings suggest that
outright owners select search methods that are more effective for finding a job, which in
turn can explain why they return to job faster in spite of lower search intensity.
This paper has the following structure. Section 2 presents the theoretical model of
search. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 describes the econometric methodology
employed for the analyses of search intensity and search methods, respectively. Section 5
provides the results for both analyses. Section 6 concludes.
2. THEORETICAL MODEL
In this section, I present a simplified model of job search with endogenous search
effort and exogenous wage offer distribution.4 The effect of homeownership is captured
by allowing for two distinct labor markets, which differ geographically as in Munch et al.
(2006). The local labor market is defined as the region in which a worker can take a job
without moving. Symmetrically, jobs in the nonlocal labor market require a move.5 This
framework allows for two distinct reservation wages, one for the local labor market and
one for jobs outside, which diverge when moving entails a cost. The effect of owning one’s
home is captured by assuming larger relocation costs.
In case of exogenous search effort, the main result of the model is that homeowners
have lower job finding rates far from home but higher job finding rates in the local labor
market (Munch et al., 2006). However, the effect on the job finding rate as a whole is
ambiguous. Treating search effort as endogenous allows to state propositions in terms of
search and to overcome this ambiguity.
The lifetime utility of the employed is kept as simple as possible, with zero separation




where w is the wage and  is the discount rate.
4See Mortensen (1986) for the background of search modeling and Manning (2009) for a similar
version.
5See Kantor et al. (2013) for a model with commuting.
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The unemployed can increase the job offer arrival rate through search effort at the
cost of a utility loss Cs. With two labor markets, the model has two distinct cost functions
and job offer arrival rates, which differ uniquely for the search effort expended in each of
them, namely sl and sn. I assume that the total cost of search is an additive function in the
two separate cost functions, that is, Cs = c(sl) + c(sn), where c′ > 0 and c′′ > 0. The arrival
rate of job offers in the local and nonlocal labor markets are, respectively, (sl) and (sn),
where ′ > 0 and ′′ < 0. Wage offers are sampled from the c.d.f. F(w), which I assume is
the same for both markets.
When choosing how to allocate search effort between the two labor markets, the
unemployed must take into account the cost of moving, that is, the cost incurred if finding
and accepting a job in the other region. Relevant to the main proposition, is the assumption
that this cost is higher for homeowners. For simplicity, this cost is set to zero for renters
(Munch et al., 2006). The value equation for the unemployed renter is
 VU = b − c(sl) − c(sn) + ((sl) + (sn))
∫
w∗r
(VE(w) − VU ) dF(w),(2)
where w∗r is the reservation wage for the renter and b is the unemployment benefit.
The unemployed sets simultaneously the reservation wage and the search effort to
maximize lifetime utility. w∗r is identical for both markets because moving is costless for
renters. Risk neutrality implies w∗r =  VU ; replacing this and Equation (1) in Equation (2),
and rearranging, I have





(w − w∗r ) dF(w).(3)
Differentiating Equation (3) with respect to sl and sn I get the first-order conditions,
c′(s∗l ) = ′(s∗l )A,(4)
c′(s∗n) = ′(s∗n)A,(5)
where A := −1 ∫
w∗r
(w − w∗r ) dF(w). It is easy to show that the unemployed renter chooses
the same search effort in both markets. In fact, from Equation (4) and Equation (5), I get
c′(s∗l )/
′(s∗l ) = c′(s∗n)/′(s∗n), which is true only when s∗l = s∗n.
If the unemployed is a homeowner, the cost m that is incurred if accepting a job in
the nonlocal labor market has to be considered. The discounted lifetime utility for the
unemployed homeowner is

















where I have already replaced VE(w) = w/ . Now, there are two distinct levels of the
reservation wage, one for each of the two markets. The reservation wage for the local labor
market is w∗l =  ṼU , while the reservation wage for jobs outside is w∗n =  ṼU + m: to
accept a job offer which requires a move, the unemployed homeowner needs compensation
for m. Equation (6) can be rewritten as













w − w∗l − m
)
dF (w).(7)
The optimal search levels in the two markets are determined by the first-order conditions
c′(s∗l ) = ′(s∗l )B,(8)
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c′(s∗n) = ′(s∗n)C,(9)
where B := −1 ∫
w∗l
(w − w∗l ) dF(w) and C := −1
∫
w∗n
(w − w∗n) dF(w). Since w∗l < w∗n, B > C
holds for any w. From Equation (8) and Equation (9), B > C implies c′(s∗l )/
′(s∗l ) >
c′(s∗n)/





the renter, for the homeowner it is optimal to search harder in the local labor market than
outside.







the renter, denoted by s∗r (identical in both cases), the effect of homeownership on overall
search can be identified by comparing s∗l + s∗n to 2s∗r . A first result is stated in the following
proposition (see Appendix A for the proof):





The relation among the reservation wages is stated in the following proposition (see
Appendix A for the proof), which is the counterpart of Proposition 1:





The rationale of Proposition 1 is straightforward. When an unemployed person has
to face a cost of moving to accept a job offer far from home, there is less searching outside,
and the search effort is centered on the local area in order to reduce the probability of
incurring this cost.6 Whether or not the homeowner searches in general less than the
renter depends on the balance of these two opposite effects. The result of the comparison
is shown in the following proposition (see Appendix A for the proof):
PROPOSITION 3. s∗l + s∗n < 2s∗r .
Proposition 3 states that the search level of the homeowner is unambiguously lower:
an increase in m from zero to a positive number, which represents just a shift from
the renter’s to the owner’s status, comes with a reduction of the total search effort. The
rationale is that, although this cost is incurred only if the homeowner actually moves,
it increases the expected cost of the search, which in turn makes unemployment more
valuable. Thus, despite the incentive to search harder locally, this expected cost has to
be covered by an extra reduction in the nonlocal search (from s∗r to s
∗
n) compared to what
would be needed to compensate for the increase in the local search (from s∗r to s
∗
l ).
Following Proposition 3, I can make clear predictions also on the whole job finding
rates. The renter’s job finding rate is two times hr = (s∗r )[1 − F(w∗r )], that is, the common
job finding rate for both markets, while the owner’s job finding rate is the sum of hl =
(s∗l )[1 − F(w∗l )] and hn = (s∗n)[1 − F(w∗n)], that is, the hazards to local and nonlocal jobs,
respectively. In order to compare job finding rates, I first remark that, by Propositions 1
and 2, hl > hr > hn. This is, the standard result that hazards to jobs with relocation and
hazards to local jobs are, respectively, higher and lower for the unemployed living in
owner-occupied accommodations (Munch et al., 2006). However, from Proposition 3, I can
derive the following stronger conclusion (see Appendix A for the proof):
PROPOSITION 4. hl + hn < 2hr.
Proposition 4 states that the job finding rate is unambiguously lower for homeowners.
This unambiguous result is not present in the model of Munch et al. (2006) with exogenous
search, but it is present in the model of Van Vuuren (2009), who generalizes the model of
Munch et al. (2006) by introducing the choice of homeownership. In Van Vuuren (2009),
6In this set-up, commuting would simply exacerbate the results by enlarging the homeowner’s local
labor market, however the main message would not be qualitatively affected (Munch et al., 2006).
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the employed can become homeowner by paying a fixed cost for buying a home, and the
result holds for a positive value of this cost.7
In conclusion, this theoretical section delivers a clear message: due to larger mobility
costs, homeowners have lower search and lower exit rates from unemployment than
renters. Therefore, the local versus nonlocal search explanation cannot falsify the main
argument underlying Oswald’s hypothesis. In the empirical section, I will provide evidence
for the comparison in search intensity between unemployed homeowners and renters.
Since the theoretical prediction is based on the difference in mobility costs, the relevant
comparison will be between outright owners and private renters.
3. DATA
I use a data set drawn from the U.K. LFS, which collects address-based interviews of
about 60,000 households for every quarter. Each individual is interviewed in five consec-
utive quarters on a rotating panel basis. The sample I use spans the period 1999–2009,
resulting in 44 calendar quarters.
The LFS provides a rich set of information on job search methods. Unemployed people
are asked to reply which specific search methods they used in the last four weeks, out of a
total of 14. The count of methods is used here to measure search intensity. See Appendix
B for the list of search methods.
Unemployed people are also asked to report the main method of search, which I
consider for the second analysis on search methods. Finally, unemployment duration is
measured by the minimum of the length of time since the start of job search and the
last job. Durations are grouped in eight time intervals: zero to three months, three to six
months, six to 12 months, one to two years, two to three years, three to four years, four to
five years, five years or more.
For consistency with the research design, I restrict to a subsample of ILO unem-
ployed8 male heads of households (aged 16–64) and I make some further sample adjust-
ments.9 Only heads of households are considered in order to capture the impact of an
individual tenure choice. For some nonheads of households, it may be misleading to seek
for a causal link from housing tenure to labor market behavior given that the former may
not reflect the outcome of an individual choice.10
4. METHODOLOGY
Job Search Intensity
The theoretical model outlined in Section 2 predicts that higher mobility costs implied
by homeownership reduce the optimal search intensity. This theory is tested by estimat-
ing the difference in search intensities between outright owners and private renters, as
discussed in Section 1. Specifically, an equation of search intensity is estimated plugging
7In the model of Van Vuuren (2009), the effect of homeownership is still ambiguous in the special
case that homeowners can receive unemployment benefits only for a fixed period while renters never run
out of it.
8ILO unemployed are people without a job who have been looking for work in the last four weeks and
are available to start a new job within the following two weeks.
9I drop observations for people who have never had a paid job, receive a retirement or old age
pension, are searching for work only as self-employed, or are waiting to take up a job already obtained.
Proxy responses are also dropped.
10Neither might the residential status of some heads of households be an individual choice, but this
issue can be handled using controls at the household level in the empirical analysis.
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own_out own_mort rent_soc rent_pri
nummet = 1 nummet = 2 nummet = 3
nummet = 4 nummet = 5 nummet = 6
nummet = 7 nummet = 8 nummet > 8
mean = 4.16 mean = 5.13 mean = 4.29 mean = 4.57
Notes: Statistics are based on the estimation sample, which consists of ILO unemployed males heads of house-
hold.
FIGURE 1: Distribution of Search Methods by Housing Tenure.
in on the right-hand side a set of dummies indicating outright owners (own_out), mort-
gagers (own_mort), and social renters (rent_soc), where private renters (rent_pri) form
the baseline category.
The dependent variable nummet is the count of search methods used (see Figure 1
for the distribution of nummet by housing tenure). Other measures of search effort have
been used in the literature, such as the time spent for search in a given time interval, the
number of employer contacts, or a combination of different measures (Green et al., 2011).
The number of search methods may be an imperfect measure of search intensity as it
cannot quantify the effort the individual dedicates to each method. Despite this criticism,
evidence suggests that this variable can capture relevant dimensions of search intensity.
In fact, it is typically found to be strongly associated to the probability of gaining job
(Holzer, 1988; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; Böheim and Taylor, 2001), notably in U.K.
data (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; Böheim and Taylor, 2001), and on the number of
job offers (Holzer, 1988). It is also strongly related to other variables coherently with
theory (Holzer, 1988; Blau and Robins, 1990; Schmitt and Wadsworth, 1993; Gregg and
Wadsworth, 1996; Addison and Portugal, 2000; Weber Mahringer, 2008; Bachmann and
Baumgarten, 2013).
When trying to identify the effect of housing tenure on search intensity, one should
take into account that selection into housing tenure can be affected by unobserved factors
that are likely to be related to labor market outcomes. For example, less mobile people
as well as people with a greater desire to retain proximity to family members or friends
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may self-select into homeownership, and restricted mobility is expected to be associated
with low search intensity. I hence adopt a structural estimation method in which hous-
ing tenure and search intensity are jointly determined, and identification of the effect
of housing tenure is achieved through exclusion restrictions. Specifically, I employ the
endogenous multinomial treatment effect model developed by Deb and Trivedi (2006a,
2006b), which takes into account selection on unobservables in a framework with a multi-
nomial treatment and a count distribution for the outcome.11
The estimation framework comprises a set of equations that model the generating
process of the treatment variables, that is, residential states, and an outcome equation
with a structural-causal interpretation. Each individual i chooses a residential status j
from a set of four choices ( j= 0, 1, 2, 3), where j= 0 is the control group (private renters).
Following Deb and Trivedi (2006a), let dj be binary selection variables representing the
observed tenure choice and also let di = (di1, di2, di3) and li = (li1, li2, li3), where lij are la-
tent factors which incorporate unobserved characteristics common to individual i’s status
choice and outcome. Then the probability function for the tenure choice is modeled by a
latent class MNL:
P(di|zi, li) = exp(z
′
ij + lij)
1 + ∑Jk=1 exp(z′ik + lik) ,(10)
where zi denotes a set of exogenous regressors and J = 3.12 The equation for the expected
count outcome is







where xi is a set of exogenous variables within zi and the j-s are the treatment coef-
ficients relative to private renters. The distribution of yi is assumed to follow a Nega-
tive Binomial (NB) process that can accommodate overdispersion of the count variable
unlike the standard Poisson (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). The data are overdispersed
if the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean, which is the case in several
applications. 13
In principle, the parameters of this model are identified through nonlinearities even if
all regressors in the outcome equation are included in the treatment equations, that is, zi =
xi. However, nonlinearity is often a poor identification strategy, and the use of exclusion
restrictions is strongly recommended (Deb and Trivedi, 2006a, 2006b). Therefore, I employ
traditional exclusion restrictions by specifying instrumental variables in the residential
status choice that are excluded from the search intensity equation. Estimation is carried
out by maximizing the simulated log likelihood based on the joint distribution of the
11See also Trivedi and Munkin (2010) for a survey of recent developments in count models, in
particular with reference to endogenous categorical regressors.
12Equation (10) already incorporates a set of normalization restrictions required for estimation.
Besides the standard restrictions for the MNL (j = 0 for j= 0), a further set of restrictions is required for
the latent factors. Following Deb and Trivedi (2006b) this amounts (i) to set equal to 0 coefficients of all
non- j latent factors in the jth selection equation and (ii) to normalize to 1 the coefficient on lij.
13In the general class of NB models, the variance is modeled by a function of the mean i and of an
overdispersion parameter 	: V[yi|xi] = i + 	pi . For p = 1 and p = 2, one has the two most known densities:
the NB of the first (NB1) and of the second kind (NB2), for which the variance is either proportional or
quadratic in the mean. For 	 = 0, the NB reduces to the Poisson.
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outcome and treatment variables. See Deb and Trivedi (2006a, 2006b) for a formal and
more detailed representation.14
Several variables have been proposed in the literature to instrument housing tenure,
or more specifically homeownership. One prominent instrument is the regional homeown-
ership rate (Van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004; Munch et al., 2006; Brunet and Lesueur,
2009). However, this instrument has also been criticized for being likely related to labor
market aggregate outcomes, hence likely to impact on individual performance (Coulson
and Fisher, 2009; De Graaff, Leuvensteijn, and Van Ewijk, 2009; De Graaff and Van Leu-
vensteijn, 2013).15 Other instruments used in the literature are the user cost of owning
compared to renting in the area (Flatau et al., 2002; Brunet and Lesueur, 2004; Barrios
Garcı́a and Rodrı́guez Hernández, 2004; Brunet and Lesueur, 2009), father’s job (Battu
et al., 2008; Brunet et al., 2007), age at entry into the housing (Brunet et al., 2007), aver-
age distance to jobs (Brunet and Lesueur, 2004, 2009), past residential status of parents
(Van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004), homeownership rate in the city where the individ-
ual was born (Van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004), age dummies (Flatau et al., 2003),
and U.S. states dummies (Green and Hendershott, 2002). Unfortunately these variables
are often based on barely convincing arguments for exogeneity or rare in data. Coulson
and Fisher (2009) employ a careful application of IV techniques using a set of plausible
instruments: the percentage of households in the area living in multifamily housing, an
indicator capturing whether the two first-born children in the household have the same
sex, and the state marginal tax rate as applied to the mortgage interest deduction.
In the present analysis, I use a set of three instruments, borrowing from Coulson and
Fisher (2009) the first and second instrument, and using the relative cost of owning with
mortgage versus renting as third instrument. Specifically, I use ln(multifamrate), samesex
and ln(Cmort/Crent), which I assume to be relevant for the housing tenure choice and to
be exogenous to search intensity once the effect of the included regressors is partialled
out. multifamrate indicates the percentage of households living in multifamily housing
for each region and quarter. House sharing among families is more common in rented
than in owner-occupied dwellings as a rent can be more easily shared than an ownership
or a mortgage. Therefore, the propensity for homeownership should be correlated to the
share of multifamily dwellings in the area (Coulson and Fisher, 2009).16
The instrument samesex has been originally designed by Angrist and Evans (1998)
to identify the causal effect of fertility on the males labor supply. Since fertility decisions
can be endogenously determined with labor force participation, Angrist and Evans (1998)
exploit the preference of parents for siblings of different sexes to instrument the number
of children. They find that the number of children does not have any effect on male labor
outcomes. Considering that the presence of children is correlated with the propensity
to become owners, Coulson and Fisher (2009) use the sex of children in the household
as an instrument for homeownership in a male unemployment equation. I replicate this
instrument using the dummy samesex, which indicates whether the two first-born children
in the household are the same sex. In the estimation sample, households for whom the
14Since the latent factors enter into the likelihood function but are unknown, the maximization of the
likelihood function is performed through simulation by drawing several random numbers from a standard
normal distribution. Provided that the number of draws is sufficiently large, maximization of the simulated
log likelihood is equivalent to maximizing the log likelihood (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon, 1984). I
used 2,000 draws; estimation with fewer draws gave remarkably similar results.
15DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) proposed a modification of this, stratifying the local homeownership
rate by race and income quantile.
16Coulson and Fisher (2009) point out that multifamily housing could be endogenous at the individual
level.
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two first-born children are the same sex are 3.7 percent more likely to have more kids.17
Moreover, households with two children are 16.2 percent more likely to be homeowners
than households with more than two children.
The third instrument is the regional ratio between mortgage costs and rental costs
and varies over years and quarters. These data are drawn from the U.K. Family Resource
Survey (FRS) since information on housing costs is not present in the LFS (see Appendix
B for details). The higher the cost of holding a mortgage on one’s home relative to the
market rent in the area, the lower should be the propensity of occupying home with a
mortgage rather than a rent.
Job Search Methods
The choice of the amount of effort to spend on search affects the job finding rate by
enhancing the probability of receiving a job offer. However the job finding rate can be
influenced by the way this effort is allocated as well. For example, stronger ties with the
local community may lead homeowners to select search channels more efficiently, for a
given total effort expended. I investigate this issue by estimating two models. First, I
estimate a MNL that models the selection process of the main search method. I group
main methods in the following six possible choices: PEC, PRIAGENCY, NEWS, DAE,
SOCNET, and other. The housing tenure dummies are included as regressors to identify
the probability of selecting a specific method for each status, controlling for the total
number of methods nummet.
Second, I perform an unemployment duration analysis to identify search methods
that are associated with faster job finding, controlling for nummet. I measure the spell
length considering the value recorded in the last interview before a transition into job or
inactivity, yet the spell is right censored if unemployment is recorded in the last inter-
view available. I estimate a competing-risks model with two possible risks, namely exits
into employment and exits into inactivity. The duration variable is grouped in discrete
intervals, therefore the likelihood of exiting into a specific state is modeled by a MNL us-
ing data expanded into person-period form and trimesters as time unit (Allison, 1982).18
This allows for unobserved factors affecting each destination-specific hazard. I consider a
subsample of 11,374 spells with stable housing tenure; 3,579 spells end in employment,
1,769 end in inactivity, and 6,026 are right censored.19
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Job Search Intensity
Table 1 shows estimates of different models for nummet. I first report OLS results to
provide a baseline estimate. However, these results do not take into consideration either
the count dimension of the dependent variable, either overdispersion or endogeneity.
The exogenous NB model deals with the first two issues. The test of the overdispersion
parameter 	 confirms the presence of a significant amount of overdispersion, supporting
the use of a NB specification over a Poisson.
17As compared to 7 percent in Angrist and Evans (1998) and 6 percent in Coulson and Fisher (2009),
who make different sample restrictions.
18Regressors are assumed spell constant and refers to the last interview before the exit, or to the last
interview for censored spells.
19Specifically, I drop a negligible amount of spells for individuals who switch housing tenure in the
quarter either immediately preceding or following the one in which the spell ends.
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TABLE 1: The Effect of Housing Tenure on Unemployed’s Search Intensity
OLS NB—exogenous NB—endogenous
 s.e.  s.e.  s.e.
own out −0.0567** (0.0150) −0.0617** (0.0122) −0.1163** (0.0147)
own mort 0.0753** (0.0129) 0.0733** (0.0104) 0.1232** (0.0134)
rent soc −0.0664** (0.0112) −0.0285** (0.0092) −0.0467** (0.0115)
white 0.0438** (0.0138) 0.0218 (0.0112) 0.0201 (0.0112)
married 0.0200* (0.0091) 0.0199** (0.0075) 0.0121 (0.0077)
claimant 0.2812** (0.0088) 0.2316** (0.0073) 0.2324** (0.0074)
disabben −0.0817** (0.0167) −0.0741** (0.0151) −0.0742** (0.0151)
Age
age 35 44 0.0336** (0.0110) 0.0207* (0.0089) 0.0153 (0.0090)
age 45 54 0.0110 (0.0115) 0.0055 (0.0094) 0.0035 (0.0095)
age 55 64 −0.0808** (0.0136) −0.0721** (0.0116) −0.0592** (0.0121)
Highest education
degree 0.2190** (0.0164) 0.2078** (0.0136) 0.2016** (0.0140)
higher educ 0.2295** (0.0179) 0.2201** (0.0146) 0.2136** (0.0148)
gce 0.1963** (0.0123) 0.1884** (0.0102) 0.1834** (0.0104)
gcse 0.1567** (0.0126) 0.1484** (0.0106) 0.1455** (0.0107)
other qual 0.1228** (0.0133) 0.1182** (0.0112) 0.1176** (0.0112)
Duration since last job
0–3 months 0.2439** (0.0182) 0.2061** (0.0158) 0.1927** (0.0161)
3–6 months 0.2477** (0.0184) 0.2111** (0.0157) 0.2027** (0.0160)
6–12 months 0.2150** (0.0180) 0.1768** (0.0153) 0.1724** (0.0156)
1–2 years 0.1792** (0.0176) 0.1495** (0.0153) 0.1486** (0.0155)
2–3 years 0.1213** (0.0203) 0.0956** (0.0177) 0.0960** (0.0178)
3–4 years 0.1143** (0.0234) 0.0984** (0.0200) 0.0995** (0.0201)
4–5 years 0.0868** (0.0254) 0.0606** (0.0221) 0.0633** (0.0223)









	 (overdispersion) 0.2209** (0.0107) 0.1834** (0.0124)
own out 0.0684** (0.0094)
own mort −0.0633** (0.0095)
rent soc 0.0244** (0.0086)
Log-likelihood −84,205.3 −84,197.6
LR exogeneity test 
 2(2) = 15.4 (p < 0.01)
Obs. 26,005 26,005 26,005
Notes: * significant at 5 percent ; ** significant at 1 percent. The dependent variable y is the count of search
methods used. In the OLS case, the logarithm of y is used so -s are semi-elasticities. For the Negative Binomial
(NB) models, -s are coefficients of the linear index, whereas exponentiated -s have the standard interpretation
in terms of factor change. The variance function used for the NB models is V[yi|xi] = (1 + 	), leading to the NB1
version. Positive 	 implies overdispersion. The sample is made of respondent male heads of households who are
ILO unemployed. Observations are quarterly for the period 1999–2009. Standard errors are clustered for regions,
years, and quarters. See Appendix B for the base categories of discrete regressors.
Endogeneity of housing tenure is accounted for estimating a multinomial endogenous treatment effects
model, where a NB for y is estimated jointly with a multinomial logit for the housing tenure choice (see Table 2).
-s are loading factors of the latent terms and positive (negative)  indicates positive (negative) selection on
unobservables. The LR test strongly supports rejection of exogeneity.
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In the third column, I report NB estimates that take into account also endogene-
ity of housing tenure. The housing tenure coefficients are strongly significant. Owning
one’s home outright implies (exp(−0.1163) − 1) · 100 = −11.0 percent lower search inten-
sity than private renting. This large “exogenous” difference in search intensity between
outright owners and private renters captures the impact of different mobility constraints.
Moreover, mortgagers have (exp(0.1232) − 1) · 100 = 13.1 percent higher search intensity
than private renters, while social renters search less by (approximately) 4.7 percent.20
The coefficients of the latent factors lij in Equation (11) capture the effect on the
search intensity of unobserved characteristics related to housing tenure. In particular, a
positive (negative)  j means that unobserved components increasing the relative probabil-
ity of selecting the j th residential status have a positive (negative) impact on the search
intensity. Estimates point to positive selection in unobservables for own out and rent soc,
and point to negative selection for own mort. Consistently, j-s in the endogenous NB are
smaller for the former states and larger for the latter. A simple likelihood ratio (LR) test
for exogeneity of housing tenure can be constructed under the null hypothesis that the
 j-s are jointly equal to zero, that is, own out = own mort = rent soc = 0. The LR statistic
suggests that exogeneity can be safely rejected.
The coefficients of the other regressors are generally consistent with standard eco-
nomic interpretation and with earlier empirical evidence using nummet as proxy for
search intensity (Holzer, 1988; Blau and Robins, 1990; Schmitt and Wadsworth, 1993;
Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; Addison and Portugal, 2000; Weber Mahringer, 2008; Bach-
mann and Baumgarten, 2013), confirming the good performance of this measure.21 Never-
theless, as a further sensitivity check, I re-estimated the model collapsing nummet in the
six most used methods (the ones considered in the analysis of individual methods). The
correlation between the two versions of nummet is very high (∼90 percent), and estimates
hold very similar.22
The estimates of the MNL for housing tenure, as showed in Table 2, are also consis-
tent with expectations and earlier evidence (Flatau et al., 2002, 2003; Van Leuvensteijn
and Koning, 2004; Battu et al., 2008; Brunet and Lesueur, 2009). In particular, the in-
struments are significant and have the expected signs. The LR test for joint significance
of instruments is fairly large confirming their relevance. In regions with larger share of
multifamily dwellings, individuals are more likely to select ownership status. Families
with two first-born children of the same sex are more likely to occupy with rentals than
owning outright. This difference is particularly strong for social tenancy, with a signif-
icantly larger likelihood than private tenancy. Ownership with mortgage stands out as
a peculiar case, with a positive and significant coefficient. Considering that samesex is
capturing the effect of the number of children, this result points out that families with
more kids tend to prefer ownership with loan than outright, reaffirming the importance
of distinguishing between ownership states. The third instrument ln(Cmort/Crent) impacts
positively the likelihood of owning with mortgage relative to tenancy. Supporting the
20These coefficients are estimates of j-s in Equation (11). Since the conditional mean of nummet is
exponential, exponentiated coefficients measure the factor increase in nummet for a switch in the status.
21The positive coefficient of claimant is consistent with the fact that eligibility to unemployment
benefits in the U.K. is conditioned on compliance with relatively strict search-related criteria (Manning,
2009; Petrongolo, 2009). Estimates hold very similar omitting the regressor claimant.
22These results are made available by the author upon request. Further estimation checks are made
available by the author concerning (i) the impact of having kids on search intensity and (ii) the subsample
of unmarried people. In case (i), binary indicators capturing the presence of at least one kid (below different
age cutoffs) does not have any impact on nummet, consistently with earlier evidence and with the use of
the instrument samesex. In case (ii), results are qualitatively unaffected.
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TABLE 2: The Housing Tenure Choice—Multinomial Logit
own out own mort rent soc
 s.e.  s.e.  s.e.
ln(multifamrate) −0.748* (0.336) −0.570* (0.260) −0.314 (0.229)
samesex −0.381** (0.130) 0.203* (0.090) 0.582** (0.083)
ln(Cmort/Crent) −0.107 (0.289) −0.469* (0.236) −0.135 (0.211)
white 0.451** (0.126) 0.407** (0.089) 0.051 (0.072)
married 1.236** (0.060) 1.561** (0.054) 0.094 (0.052)
claimant −0.641** (0.058) −0.405** (0.050) 0.513** (0.045)
disabben 0.101 (0.120) 0.371** (0.108) 0.699** (0.088)
Age
age 35 44 1.569** (0.111) 1.248** (0.062) 0.262** (0.053)
age 45 54 3.017** (0.113) 1.728** (0.070) 0.377** (0.063)
age 55 64 4.482** (0.112) 1.884** (0.078) 0.480** (0.075)
Highest education
degree 0.663** (0.119) 0.667** (0.096) −1.365** (0.095)
higher educ 0.601** (0.133) 0.789** (0.113) −0.867** (0.109)
gce 0.375** (0.094) 0.574** (0.079) −0.573** (0.065)
gcse 0.180 (0.104) 0.409** (0.083) −0.268** (0.069)
other qual −0.174 (0.103) −0.018 (0.083) −0.203** (0.065)
Duration since last job
0–3 months 0.381** (0.131) 1.233** (0.119) −0.998** (0.093)
3–6 months 0.632** (0.131) 1.069** (0.123) −0.759** (0.093)
6–12 months 0.552** (0.130) 0.736** (0.123) −0.585** (0.094)
1–2 years 0.375** (0.128) 0.323** (0.119) −0.476** (0.088)
2–3 years 0.157 (0.144) 0.083 (0.137) −0.402** (0.101)
3–4 years 0.223 (0.162) −0.026 (0.151) −0.458** (0.116)
4–5 years 0.089 (0.175) −0.308 (0.174) −0.416** (0.133)









LR test for instruments ∼ 
 2(9) 91.7 (p < 0.01)
LR test for instruments ∼ 
 2(3) 14.0 (p < 0.01) 13.2 (p < 0.01) 51.1 (p < 0.01)
Obs. 26,005
Notes: * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. The table shows estimates of the MNL model
for housing tenure estimated jointly with the NB for search intensity. Results for the latter are shown in Table 1.
Notes to that table apply here. -s are coefficients of the index function. Standard errors are adjusted for 867
clusters in regions, years and quarters, to account for aggregate instrumental variables. The LR statistic tests
the joint significance of the instrumental variables ln(multi famrate), ln(Cmort/Crent) and samesex.
relevance of these instruments is also the fact that their coefficients are jointly signifi-
cant in each treatment equation.
Unfortunately, there is no formal test for the validity of exclusion restrictions in a
nonlinear setting such this. However, as an informal check of exogeneity I estimated the
same model but including instrumental variables also in the outcome equation. Their
coefficients turn out to be individually and jointly not significant, which is quite a strong
result given the sample size and the significance of the other coefficients.23
23These results are made available by the author upon request.
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Notes: Predicted probabilities are computed from estimates of the multinomial logit reported in Table 3.
The quantity reported is the probability P(main = i|HT = j, X = X̄) of selecting the main method main = i
(i = 1, . . . , 6), for given housing tenure HT = j ( j= 0, . . . , 3) and with regressors evaluated at sample means.
FIGURE 2: Selection of Main Method of Search by Housing Tenure.
Job Search Methods
In Table 3, I report estimates of the MNL for the six main methods of search. These
estimates are used to compute the conditional probabilities of selecting each method by
housing tenure, that are reported in Figure 2. PEC and NEWS account for a large por-
tion of the distribution of methods. Statistically significant differences between outright
owners and private renters are found only for NEWS and for PEC, with outright owners
preferring the former, and private renters preferring the latter.
Concerning the effectiveness of search methods, related studies have documented
that PEC are typically poorly effective for unemployed and their use has often been
criticized (Holzer, 1988; Blau and Robins, 1990; Bishop and Abraham, 1993; Ports, 1993;
Addison and Portugal, 2000; Longhi and Taylor, 2011). Unemployed who do not rely
mainly on PEC are likely to be more proactive in their job search, therefore having
enhanced chances to find a job (Longhi and Taylor, 2011). However, the PEC may be
often approached when alternative search channels are not available (Bachmann and
Baumgarten, 2013), hence it may be also possible that PEC is less effective because used
at the last resort (Green, 2012). The coefficient of ln(nummet) in Table 3 suggests actually
that unemployed who use more methods prefer any method to PEC.
In Table 4, I report estimates of the competing-risks model for the unemployed. First,
consistently with standard theory and evidence, nummet has strong positive impact on
the hazard to job, and strong negative impact on the hazard to inactivity. Moreover I
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TABLE 4: Competing Risks Model for Unemployment Duration
risk=job risk=inactivity
RRR s.e. RRR s.e.
own out 1.551** (0.075) 1.581** (0.072)
own mort 1.922** (0.077) 1.200** (0.053)
rent soc 1.345** (0.047) 1.446** (0.051)
ln(nummet) 1.328** (0.033) 0.652** (0.013)
white 1.296** (0.056) 1.388** (0.060)
married 1.393** (0.038) 1.202** (0.033)
claimant 0.903** (0.026) 0.574** (0.017)
disabben 0.673** (0.035) 1.648** (0.058)
incsup 0.547** (0.026) 1.263** (0.042)
Main search method
PRIAGENCY 1.297** (0.081) 0.843* (0.065)
NEWS 1.103** (0.033) 1.078** (0.031)
DAE 1.213** (0.056) 1.035 (0.053)
SOCNET 0.937 (0.045) 1.267** (0.056)
OTHER 1.439** (0.110) 1.113 (0.086)
Spell duration
3–6 months 0.780** (0.029) 1.042 (0.046)
6–12 months 0.637** (0.022) 1.056 (0.041)
1–2 years 0.520** (0.018) 1.025 (0.038)
2–3 years 0.430** (0.020) 1.009 (0.043)
3 over 0.403** (0.022) 0.986 (0.046)
Age
age 35 44 0.995 (0.034) 1.140** (0.044)
age 45 54 0.864** (0.031) 1.185** (0.045)
age 55 64 0.561** (0.023) 1.538** (0.061)
Highest education
degree 1.415** (0.071) 1.109* (0.056)
higher educ 1.206** (0.070) 0.942 (0.055)
gce 1.371** (0.053) 1.108** (0.038)
gcse 1.290** (0.052) 1.026 (0.040)










Notes: * significant at 5 percent; * significant at 1 percent. The base category for the main method of
search is PEC. See Appendix B for the base categories of the other discrete regressors. Reported coefficients are
Relative Risk Ratios (RRR). Robust standard errors are reported. The sample is made of unemployment spells of
respondent male heads of households who use at least one method of search. The unemployment spell can end
with a job, with inactivity or be right censored.
find the typical result that homeowners have higher chance to escape unemployment
for a job than renters. In particular, mortgagers have the best performance and outright
owners have 55.1 percent higher risk of finding job than private renters. In agreement
with previous evidence, I find that, relatively to PEC, four methods are associated with
higher relative risk to find a job, namely PRIAGENCY, DAE, NEWS and OTHER. The
fact that NEWS shortens significantly the unemployment duration relatively to PEC is
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somewhat interesting given that outright owners select significantly more the former and
private renters the latter.
Taken jointly, these results suggest that outright owners, and homeowners in general,
tend to select search methods associated with shorter unemployment spells. This finding
can be related to a better position to identify more efficient channels that homeowners
have locally, due to their longer expected tenure in the community. Certainly, homeowners
can access more easily relevant information and opportunities in the area they reside in,
because they are more well established and can rely on a denser SOCNET therein. This
can explain why homeowners are, on the one hand, less likely to use PEC (Osberg, 1993),
and, on the other hand, more likely to use NEWS. Indeed it has to be remarked that NEWS
can be used for national as well as local jobs and hence it can be efficient for homeowners.
On the contrary, individuals with less tight connections with the local community should
be less aware of or have limited access to search channels other than PEC (Bachmann and
Baumgarten, 2013), which can be less effective. Because PEC can typically lead to local
jobs, it can be also less efficient for renters. In the end, it seems that the spatial bias in
search activities induced by mobility constraints, with homeowners searching relatively
more locally and renters relatively more nonlocally, is more beneficial to owners.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated the well-known argument that homeownership reduces
exit rates from unemployment by hampering residential mobility, known as Oswald’s
hypothesis. The empirical literature has confirmed that unemployed homeowners are
less prone than renters to move for job reasons, but it has also found that homeowners
have typically shorter unemployment spells, as opposite to Oswald’s hypothesis. A novel
solution to this puzzle has been explored in this paper by emphasizing the distinction
between the unemployed’s job search intensity and unemployment duration, and by using
a multinomial definition of housing tenure.
A first contribution has been to show that mobility constraints induced by homeown-
ership have a negative impact on search. In a simple model of endogenous search with
moving costs, I have shown that homeowners search more intensively than renters for
jobs in the local area, but search much less intensively in distant areas, so that their
total search level is unambiguously lower. Accordingly, the present econometric analysis
has shown that outright owners search less intensively than private renters, even after
controlling for endogeneity of housing tenure. It has to be remarked that outright own-
ers are not committed to mortgage payments potentially counteracting the effect of the
restricted mobility of owning one’s home. Indeed, as consistent with the argument that
these obligations bear higher pressure to reenter employment, mortgagers are found to
have the highest search. This latter finding suggests that, whether or not mortgagers
are locked into their homes when the price declines, their job search and therefore job
inflows are relatively modestly hampered. Finally, I have found that social renters search
significantly less than private renters, corroborating the intuition that lock-in effects can
hinder their incentive to search.
But still, why do outright owners search less intensively than renters and have at
the same time better chances of escaping unemployment? I have pointed out that while
higher mobility costs affect the search intensity and reservation wages in the first place,
unemployment outcomes could diverge for other reasons. Therefore, a second contribution
has been to investigate empirically the choice of search methods as an explanation of
diverging unemployment outcomes. The evidence I have come up with shows that the two
types of renter rely more on public employment offices and the two types of homeowner
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rely more on newspapers advertisements, whereas the latter channel is associated with
relatively shorter unemployment spells. It follows that the selection of more effective
search methods could explain outright owners’ better unemployment outcomes in spite of
a lower overall amount of search.
The selection of more effective methods can be put down to homeowners’ longer
expected tenure in the community they reside in. Indeed, a stronger connection with the
local SOCNET can ease access to relevant information and opportunities in the area,
while renters may be constrained to rely extensively on PEC, that can be less effective
and more concerned with local jobs. Therefore, the present evidence suggests overall that
mobility constraints, by limiting the spatial extension of the search process, may bring
about a redistribution of search activities more efficient for homeowners. In particular,
comparative advantages in the local search may compensate for disproportionately lower
nonlocal search, resulting ultimately in shorter unemployment duration.
This line of reasoning can provide a solution to the puzzle of unemployment and
housing tenure, and can open the way for further analysis based on the search behavior.
In this respect, it would be of interest to investigate the extent to which different search
methods are conducive to local and nonlocal jobs. Moreover, while in the present analysis
the focus has been on the unemployed’s behavior, other explanations could focus on the
employer’s side. For example, employers may prefer to hire workers who own their own
accommodation since their expected job tenure is longer (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1992).
Investigation of these insights is left for future research.
APPENDIX A: PROOFS OF THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS
I report below proofs of the propositions stated in Section 2.
Proof of Proposition 1.
(a) s∗l > s
∗
r . The proof makes use of the derivative of s
∗
l with respect to m, which is defined
by the implicit function theorem. First, dw∗l /dsl and dw
∗
l /dm are defined and evaluated







(w − w∗l ) F′(w)dw − c′(sl)
1 + −1(sl)[1 − F(w∗l )] + −1(sn)[1 − F(w∗n)]
,(A1)
which is equal to 0 for sl = s∗l , since the numerator is equal to 0 (as follows directly from
the first order condition for s∗l ). Moreover, dw
∗
l /dsl > (<)0 if sl < (>)s
∗
l . Differentiating
Equation (7) with respect to w∗l and m one obtains
dw∗l
dm
= − (sn)[1 − F(w
∗
l + m)]
1 + −1(sl)[1 − F(w∗l )] + −1(sn)[1 − F(w∗n)]
< 0,(A2)
which is negative for any value of sl. Intuitively, wl drops as m increases since the
acceptance of a job far from home comes with a lower expected surplus. I rewrite now
the first order condition for s∗l as







[w − w∗l (s∗l , m)]F′(w)dw = 0,(A3)
which is used to compute s∗l and m. Specifically:
s∗l = c′′(s∗l ) − −1′′(s∗l )
∫
w∗l
(w − w∗l )F′(w)dw > 0,(A4)
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which uses the fact that dw∗l /dsl = 0 when sl = s∗l , and








where inequalities derive from c′′ > 0, F′ > 0, ′ > 0, ′′ < 0 and dw∗l /dm < 0. Then,














c′′(s∗l ) − −1′′(s∗l )
∫
w∗l
(w − w∗l )F′(w)dw
> 0.(A6)
As expected, s∗l increases as m increases; since the relation between s
∗
l and m is
positive for any value of m, this will be true in particular when m = 0, that is, when
the optimal search locally (and nonlocally) is s∗r = s∗l . Thus, when m becomes positive,
which captures a shift from tenant to owner status, the local search increases from s∗r
to s∗l .
(b) s∗n < s
∗





I study the sign of ds∗n/dm. Differentiating the equation w
∗
n = w∗l + m with respect







(w − w∗n) F′(w)dw − c′(sn)
1 + −1(sl)[1 − F(w∗l )] + −1(sn)[1 − F(w∗n)]
.(A7)
Given the first order condition for s∗n, this derivative is equal to 0 when sn = s∗n.
Moreover, dw∗n/dsn > (<)0 if sn < (>)s
∗
n. Differentiating with respect to w
∗




=  + (sl)[1 − F(w
∗
l )]
1 + −1(sl)[1 − F(w∗l )] + −1(sn)[1 − F(w∗n)]
> 0,(A8)
which is positive for any value of sn. A rise in m requires a higher wage to induce the
homeowner to move for a job. I rewrite the first order condition for s∗n as





[w − w∗n(s∗n, m)]F′(w)dw = 0,(A9)
which is used to compute s∗n and m. Specifically:
s∗n = c′′(s∗n) − −1′′(s∗n)
∫
w∗n
(w − w∗n)F′(w)dw > 0,(A10)









where inequalities derive from c′′ > 0, F′ > 0, ′ > 0, ′′ < 0 and dw∗n/dm > 0. Then,



















ds∗n/dm is negative for any value of m, thus when m increases from 0 to a positive
number the nonlocal search is reduced from s∗r to s
∗
n. 
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Proof of Proposition 2.
Given the first-order conditions (4), (5), (8), and (9), the result of Proposition 1 and
that c′(·)/′(·) is an increasing function, it follows that
w∗l < w
∗






←→ s∗l > s∗r ,
w∗n > w
∗






←→ s∗n < s∗r . 
Proof of Proposition 3.
Since the closed form for the optimal search levels cannot be derived, the proof
relies on ds∗l /dm and ds
∗
n/dm evaluated at m = 0, that is, the case of identical search.
The (opposite) marginal variations at m = 0 can be interpreted simply as “marginal”
differences in each market’s search levels between the homeowner and the renter. The
key for the proof is to demonstrate that the magnitude of the marginal decrease in the
nonlocal search is higher than the marginal increase in the local search.
Equation (A6) and Equation (A12) represent the marginal variations of the home-
owner’s local and nonlocal search, respectively. When m = 0, one has s∗l = s∗r = s∗n; hence
the two derivatives are identical except for the derivatives of the reservation wage in the
numerator, which have opposite signs:
ds∗l
dm






dm (m = 0)
)
F′(w)dw
c′′(s∗r ) − −1′′(s∗r )
∫
w∗r










dm (m = 0)
)
F′(w)dw
c′′(s∗r ) − −1′′(s∗r )
∫
w∗r
(w − w∗r )F′(w)dw
.(A14)
Making use of Equation (A2) and Equation (A8), I can evaluate the derivatives of the
reservation wages at the optimal values of search when m = 0:
dw∗l
dm
(s∗r , m = 0) = −
(s∗r )[1 − F(w∗r ]




(s∗r , m = 0) =
 + (s∗r )[1 − F(w∗r )]
1 + −1(s∗r )[1 − F(w∗r )] + −1(s∗r )[1 − F(w∗r )]
.(A16)










r , m = 0)|, which in turn implies
|ds∗ndm (m = 0)| >
ds∗l
dm (m = 0). This means that the difference in the nonlocal search between
homeowner and renter is higher, in absolute value, than the difference in the local search,
that is s∗r − s∗n > s∗l − s∗r . 
Proof of Proposition 4.
I just need to prove that the derivative of (hl + hn) with respect to m at the optimal





r , m = 0) = Nw,
ds∗l
dm (m = 0) = Ls, and ds
∗
n
dm (m = 0) = Ns, one has
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d(hl + hn)
dm
(s∗r , m = 0) = ′(s∗r )
[
1 − F(w∗r )
]
Ls − (s∗r )F′(w∗r )Lw
+ ′(s∗r )
[
1 − F(w∗r )
]
Ns − (s∗r )F′(w∗r )Nw =
= ′(s∗r )
[
1 − F(w∗r )
]
(Ls + Ns) − (s∗r )F′(w∗r )(Lw + Nw) < 0,
(A17)
where the latter inequality holds since (Ls + Ns) < 0 and (Lw + Nw) > 0; see
Proposition 3. 
APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
Housing Tenure: own_out: accommodation owned outright; own_mort: accommodation
owned with mortgage; rent_soc: accommodation rented from Local Authorities or Hous-
ing Associations; rent_pri: accommodation rented from private.
nummet: Count of search methods used by unemployed people. People who state they
have been looking for work in the last four weeks are asked to reply whether or not
they used any of the following methods: (1) visiting a Jobcentre, (2) visiting a Careers
Office, (3) visiting a Jobclub, (4) having owns name on the books of a private employment
agency, (5) advertising for jobs in newspapers or journals, (6) answering advertisements
in newspapers and journals, (7) study vacant situations in newspapers or journals, (8)
apply directly to employers, (9) ask friends, relatives, colleagues, or trade unions about
jobs, (10) waiting for the results of job application, (11) looking for premises or equipment,
(12) seeking any kind of permit, (13) trying to get a loan or other financial backing for
a job or business, (14) doing anything else to find work. nummet is the sum of positive
answers. I drop individuals who search only as self-employed.
Main method of search: Each individual is asked to report the main method of search
used. I group methods in the six most used: PEC: (1)+(2)+(3); PRIAGENCY: (4); NEWS:
(5)+(6)+(7); DAE: (8)+(10); SOCNET: (9); OTHER: (11)+(12)+(13)+(14).
white: Race dummy.
married: Whether legally married (not separated), regardless of living in the same house-
hold.
claimant: Whether claiming the Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA).
disabben: Whether on sickness or disability benefit.
incsup: Whether claiming income support not related to unemployment.
Age: Omitted category in regressions is 16–34 years.
Highest education: Education dummies refer to the highest education level attained. Cat-
egories are: (1) Degree or equivalent (2) higher education, (3) GCE, A-level or equivalent,
(4) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent, (5) other qualifications, (6) no qualification. The
base category in the regressions is (6).
Duration since last job: (1) Less than three months, (2) three months but less than six, (3)
six months but less than 12, (4) one year but less than two, (5) two years but less than
three, (6) three years but less than four, (7) four years but less than five, (8) five years
or more, (9) more than eight years ago. Category (9) is omitted in regressions.
Occupation in last job: (1) Managers and administrators, (2) professional occupations, (3)
associate professional and technical occupations, (4) clerical or secretarial occupations,
(5) craft and related occupations, (6) plant and machine operatives, (7) other occupations.
Region dummies: (1) Tyne and Wear, (2) Rest of North East, (3) Greater Manchester, (4)
Merseyside, (5) Rest of North West, (6) South Yorkshire, (7) West Yorkshire, (8) Rest of
Yorkshire and the Humberside, (9) East Midlands, (10) West Midlands and Metropolitan
County, (11) Rest of West Midlands, (12) Eastern, (13) Inner London, (14) Outer London,
(15) South East, (16) South West, (17) Wales, (18) Strathclyde, (19) Rest of Scotland, (20)
Northern Ireland.
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Quarter dummies: qrtr1 (January-March), qrtr2 (April-June), qrtr3 (July-September),
qrtr4 (October-December).
Year dummies: The sample spans the period 1999–2009 for a total of 11 years and 44
quarters of observations.
ln(multifamrate): The variable multifamrate indicates the percentage of households living
in multifamily housing for each region and quarter.
ln(Cmort/Crent): The variables Cmort and Crent capture average housing costs for mortgagers
and renters at regional and quarter level. Data on housing costs are retrieved from the
U.K. Family Resource Survey (FRS). For mortgagers, I consider the total weekly mort-
gage costs including mortgage payments, endowment policies, structural insurance and
service payments. For renters, I consider the total weekly rent payment comprehensive
of service charges. These variables are expressed in real weekly pounds of 2010q2 and
are weighted with household sampling weights. In the FRS around 25,000 households
are surveyed for each year using a stratified random sample. The primary sampling
unit (PSU) is the postcode sector. For each year, the PSUs are systematically allocated
to quarters to ensure that the sample is balanced on a quarterly basis.
samesex: Dummy indicating whether the two first-born children in the household are the
same sex.
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Estimation Micro-Économétrique sur Données Françaises,” Revue Économique, 55, 569–578.
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